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Abstract. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-
theoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good.
Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to
public good production. Without relying on rst order conditions, the authors
demonstrate existence of Nash equilibrium and an extension of Warrs neutral-
ity result  any redistribution of endowment that left the set of contributors
unchanged would induce a new equilibrium with the same total public good pro-
vision. The assumption of one-private good greatly facilities the results. We
provide analogues of the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian results in a model allow-
ing multiple private and public goods. In addition, we relate the strategic market
game equilibrium to the private provision of equilibrium of Villanaci and Zengi-
nobuz (2005), which provides a counter-part to the Walrasian equilibrium for a
public goods economy. Our techniques follow those of Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2003), which itself grows out of the seminal work of Shapley and Shubik (1977).
Our approach also incorporates, into the strategic market game literature, eco-
nomies with production, not previously treated and, as a by-product, establishes
a new existence of private-provision equilibrium.
JEL Classication: D01, D40, D51
Keywords: Public goods, market games, equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, private
provision, voluntary contributions.
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1 Strategic market games and public goods
One of the most important papers on public good provision is Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986), BBV. This paper brought strategic behavior in public pro-
vision to the forefront of public economic theory. In contrast to personalized
prices for public goods, as in Samuelson (1954) and Foley (1970) for example,
BBV treats a game-theoretic model in which the strategies of the players are their
own voluntary contributions to public good provision. The BBV model focuses
on a situation with one private good that can be consumed or contributed to
public good provision. In addition to existence of equilibrium, BBV demonstrate
conditions under which Warrs neutrality result redistributions of endowments
do not change the equilibrium allocation of private goods and the total amount
of public good provided continues to hold.4
The elegant model of BBV raises a number of challenges, including the de-
velopment of a strategic model for the analysis of voluntary contributions equi-
librium in situations with multiple private goods and with production of public
goods. This challenge motivates the current paper. In the context of an economy
with nite numbers of agents (consumers and rms), we rst introduce the con-
cept of a private-provision equilibrium, due to Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005),
VZ. In private-provision equilibrium, agents take prices for private and public
goods as given, rms maximize prots, and subject to their budget constraints,
consumers choose their private goods consumptions and the amounts of their
contributions to the provision of the public good. We rst extend the concept
of private provision equilibrium to treat both multiple public and private goods.
We then develop a continuum representation of the economy. The equilibrium
outcomes of the associated economy with a continuum of agents coincide with
those of the original economy with a nite number of agents. This aspect is
novel and is, in part, due to our representation of utility functions of consumers
in a continuum. In our continuum model, with regard to private goods, players
are negligible while, with regard to public goods, consumers are in the same
4There are numerous precursors to the BBVmodel and results; see their paper for references.
Many other authors have studied existence of equilibrium and Warrs neutrality result in a
variety of contexts; see, for example, Kemp (1984), Itaya, de Meza and Myles (2002), Cornes
and Itaya (2010), Silvestre (2012), Allouch (2012) and others. A recent contribution to the
literature on existence is provided in Florenzano (2009), which highlights the similarities with
existence of price-taking equilibrium in other contexts and, like this paper, allows mutliple
public and private goods.
4
situations as the consumers in the nite economy.
We next introduce a strategic model with a continuum of players. Our strate-
gic model is an adaptation of a Shapley-Shubik market game, as developed by
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003). In these papers, trading is carried out at spe-
cialized trading posts each post specializes in the trade of one private good.
We add provision posts for contributions of public goods. Roughly, we show that
for any nite economy there is an associated market game with a continuum of
players (consumers and rms) with the property that the strategic Nash equilib-
ria of the market game induce private provision equilibria of the nite economy.
The intuitive meaning of our result is that in a large (but nite) economy,
Nash equilibria approximate private provision equilibria. We also demonstrate a
neutrality result.
Let us provide more background and motivation for our work and also some
additional discussion. The private provision equilibrium model of VZ treats a
general equilibrium model with multiple private good and one public good. Their
private provision equilibrium concept is in the tradition of classic general equili-
brium models in that agents5 take prices as given and maximize their payo¤s 
consumers maximize their utilities and rms maximize their prots. An innova-
tive feature of the model of VZ is that agents purchase the public good at its per
unit supply price, rather than at personalized prices as in Samuelson (1954) and
Foley (1970) and choose the amount of the public good they purchase. The sum,
over all agents, of the amounts of public good purchased is the total amount of
the public good provided to the consumers in the economy. The model of VZ
is important and interesting. It provides an analogue, in the tradition of Wal-
ras, of the model and voluntary contributions equilibrium of BBV. The model
and equilibrium of VZ, however, has not until now had foundations in strategic
game-theoretic equilibrium.6
In this paper we provide strategic foundations for private provision equili-
5When considering general equilibrium models and, in particular, the model of VZ we will
refer to the members of the economy as agentswhile when we consider strategic models we
will refer to the members of the economy as players. We use the terms consumers and
rmsin both situations.
6Rephrasing some remarks in Dubey and Genakoplos (2003, p. 392), the most salient
feature of the game theoretic-theoretic approach is that .. no matter what strategies agents
choose a feasible outcome is always engendered. In Walrasian analysis (and in the analysis of
VZ) we are left in the dark as to what happens out equilibrium. (Insertions in parentheses
are ours.)
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brium. Our approach owes much to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), DG. Recall
that DG demonstrates that Walrasian equilibria of a private goods economy are
the limits of Nash equilibria of a sequence of strategic games. The DG paper is
deep and insightful. It also provides an excellent discussion of the related litera-
ture on the strategic foundations of Walrasian equilibrium. We briey described
their model and approach. DG begin with a private goods exchange economy,
a nite set of households, and a Walrasian equilibrium. They then develop a
representation of the model with a continuum of players of a nite number of
types. In the continuum representation, there is the same measure of all play-
ers of each type and all players of the same type are identical (and identical to
one player in the nite economy). The DG continuum model is a variant of the
Shapley-Shubik strategic trading-post game. There is a trading postfor each
commodity. Each player delivers his entire endowment of each commodity to
the trading post designated for that commodity. Money can be borrowed to buy
commodities and then paid back when the player receives monetary payments
for his endowment. Money itself has no intrinsic value but there is a penalty
for default if the value of the players endowment falls short of the value of his
purchases. Also, there is a bound M on the amount of money that a player may
borrow. Letting M go to innity creates a sequence of games. Each game in
the sequence has a Nash equilibrium. A limit of the equilibrium outcomes gener-
ates a Walrasian equilibrium for the initial economy.7 In this way, DG provides
strategic foundations for the Walrasian equilibrium.
As noted, our strategic game approach follows that of DG but with the addi-
tion of provision posts, to which consumers can make contributions of money
7To motivate the need for a bound on money, recall that in their seminal paper, Shapley-
Shubik take one commodity as numeraire. Each consumer chooses the amounts of this commo-
dity to allocate to purchasing private goods. For existence of equilibrium, it is necessary to
bound the strategy set of each consumer by her endowment of the numeraire commodity. In
this case, with bounds on strategy sets, it is not necessarily true that a Nash equilibrium of
the game is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Subsequent and related works consider at inside money. In these models, a bound in
the amount of money that each consumer can borrow restricts admissible trades and, again,
an equilibrium in the game cannot be a Walrasian equilibrium. DG consider a sequence of
truncated games and show that the limit of a sequence of equilibria for the games is a Walrasian
equilibrium.
In our model, the need to impose a bound on money and also to consider limits of equilibria
is similar to that of DG rst, to obtain existence of Nash equilibrium and then to relate Nash
equilibria of the strategic games to Walrasian equilibrium in the nite economy.
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to provide the public good associated with each provision post. As in DG, con-
sumers take their endowments of private goods to trading posts and can spend
money on both private and public goods at the each post. The strategy of a
consumer is the amount of money that she will spend (or contribute) to each
post. The strategy of a rm states the amount that the rm will spend on
each input. Prices at each post are determined by the total money spent at
the post divided by the number of units of the commodity provided, either the
aggregate endowment of that commodity or the aggregate amount of the public
good provided by rms. With an additional condition bounding the numbers of
units of produced commodities away from zero, we establish existence of Nash
equilibrium. We show that as the bound on the numbers of units of produced
goods goes to zero andM is allowed to go to innity, there is a sequence of Nash
equilibria with corresponding allocations and prices that converge to a private
provision equilibrium for the nite economy.
One of the striking features of the BBV paper is their neutrality result, which
generalizes those of Warr (1983) and Kemp (1984). BBV does not rely on rst
order conditions, but instead obtain their results using properties resulting from
optimization by individual agents. In BBV, with one private good and one public
good, the authors consider perturbations of the endowments of the consumers.
They prove that an equilibrium for the economy generates an equilibrium for
the perturbed economy in which all consumers have the same private goods
allocation and the total public good contribution is unchanged, provided that the
perturbation does not change the total amount of endowment of the economy and
every consumer can a¤ord his initial equilibrium consumption of private goods.
We show that an analogous result holds for our model.
Our work has some quite novel features motivated by the complexity of issues
involved. First, it is possible to model nite private goods exchange economies
as market games with the same, nite set of players. But the complexities
are considerable; we refer the reader to the excellent discussion of Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2003). For private-goods price-taking to be close to fully ratio-
nal and strategic behavior, we must have an economy with a large number of
participants. But for a close approximation, as argued by a number of authors,
we can use a continuum economy. In interpretation of our work we thus assume
that having a continuum of rms well approximates a situation with a large but
nite number of rms. For (pure) public goods, however, we cannot directly well
approximate an economy or game with a nite number of players by a continuum
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model; in such models, the individual consumer is negligible and his contribu-
tion to public good provision is negligible. (A rst paper making this point is
Muench, 1972). It is well known, however, and will be illustrated by an exam-
ple, that in sequences of growing economies with a public good, the amount of
public good may converge to a strictly positive amount. Thus, we do not treat
a continuum limitmodel; we represent a nite game as a game with a con-
tinuum of players. Our continuum game representation of the nite model is
as ifthere is a continuum of rms and consumers, insofar as private goods are
involved but consumers, the contributors to public good provision, are inuenced
by their own public good provision and the average contributions of consumers
of other types. (See the example in Section 4 and our concluding section).That
is, in the continuum it is as if an individual is una¤ected by the contributions
of others of her own type or views herself as a representative member of her
type. Thus, even though the individual consumer is in the same situation as in
the nite economy with regard to the total amount of public good consumed,
she is strategically negligible. We note that in the case of one-private-good our
game-theoretic framework is equivalent to that of BBV.
As a by-product of our results, we obtain existence of the private provision
equilibrium with both multiple public goods and private goods, thus extending
the Villanacci and Zenginobuz result for the case of constant returns to scale in
production of public goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we
present the model and the corresponding market equilibrium. In Section 4, we
state some remarks with respect to large economies and public goods that might
be helpful to a better understanding of the strategic market approach provided
in this work. In Section 5, we dene a game for the private provision of public
goods and then, in Section 6, we show existence of Nash equilibrium for the
games we consider. In Section 7, we obtain our main result which states that
the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria results in a market equilibrium. In
Section 8 we provide a neutrality result. Section 9 concludes the paper. In a
nal Appendix, we present the proofs of all the results stated in this paper. But
before leaving this introduction we comment further on the literature on strategic
market games to further relate our work to the literature and to indicate future
directions for research.
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Remarks on selected literature on strategic market games:
1. A question that immediately arises in the strategic market game context is
whether prices are positive. This question was addressed by Peck, Shell and
Spear (1992) who demonstrate conditions on a private-goods economy under
which there are strictly positive equilibrium bids for all goods (and provide an
in-depth study of the model).8 We cannot establish such a result and do not
aim to do so, given that we wish to allow situations where some consumers
do not contribute to public good provision and we allow production, with the
possibility that some public goods are not produced. Like our paper, Peck, Shell
and Spear consider an insideor at money, representing the private debt of the
consumers with default penalties but, unlike the situation in our continuum game
model, there is no bound on consumer debt. We require such a bound; otherwise
consumer demands would be unlimited and, as DG, we wish to demonstrate
that, with many players, price-taking equilibrium outcomes arise as outcomes of
strategic behavior.9
2. Another important question is the convergence of equilibrium outcomes of
nite economies to the continuum model. For private-goods economies, conver-
gence of strategic market-game equilibrium to no-arbitrage equilibrium is demon-
strated in Koutsougeras (2003a) and in Amir and Bloch (2009).10
3. For private-goods economies, Amir and Block (2009) demonstrate that when
both goods are normal, prices increase with the number of buyers (holding the
number of sellers constant). With strategic market games with public goods
economies, it may be especially interesting to examine what happens to the set of
contributors as a (nite) set of players increases in size. This question has already
been examined in the literature in a path-breaking paper, Andreoni (2002), on
private provision equilibrium; we conjecture that analogues of Andreonis (2002)
results will hold for strategic market games with public goods and nite but
growing player sets.11
8Peck, Shell and Spear (1992) also treat existence, structure and dimension of the manifold
of Nash equilibrium allocations in a strategic market game
9The treatment of money in a strategic market game has been a subject of intense debate.We
prefer to have at money as we believe it is a better t for the intuitive notions of a public
goods economy underlying our model. We thank Gael Giraud, Hubert Kempf, and Herakles
Polemarchakis for stressing this point. See Gael (2003) for some discussion of this and relevant
references.
10See also Koutsougeras (2003b).
11Mention of "Andreoni" recalls his theory of warm-glow giving (Andreoni 1990). We con-
9
4. But will players, over time, learn to play the equilibrium of a strategic market
game in the presence of public goods? Brangewitz and Giraud (2011) address this
issue for a very general model of a private-goods economy. It may be interesting
to consider this question in a model with public goods but su¢ ciently specic to
allow comparative statics of interest to public economic theory.
Finally, we refer the reader to Giraud (2003) for a recent review of the litera-
ture on strategic market games.
2 The model
We consider an economy E with a nite number L of private goods and a nite
number K of public goods. There is a set N of N consumers who consume
private goods and collectively consume public goods. Each consumer i 2 N =
f1; : : : ; Ng is characterized by her endowment of private goods ei 2 RL++ and by
her preference relation over commodity space RL+K+ . Preferences are represented
by a continuous, concave and monotone-increasing utility function Ui : RL+K++ !
R+: Dene e =
PN
i=1ei:
There are K rms that produce public goods. A rm k 2 f1; :::; Kg is char-
acterized by a production function Fk : RL+ ! R+ that converts private goods
into public good k:We assume that each Fk is continuous, concave, and exhibits
constant returns to scale. Each consumer i 2 N owns a share ki  0 of the rm
ks prot and
PN
i=1 
k
i = 1 for each k:
3 Private provision equilibrium
A price system is a vector (p; q) 2 RL+K+ ; where p = (p`; ` = 1; : : : ; L) denotes
the vector of prices for the L private commodities and q = (qk; k = 1; : : : ; K)
denotes the vector of prices for the K public goods.
Given a price system (p; q) 2 RL+K+ and prots k for each rm k; consumers
choose private goods consumption and voluntary contributions to public good
provision. Each consumer takes as given the contributions of the other con-
sumers. That is, given a vector (gj; j 2 N ; j 6= i) of voluntary contributions,
jecture that our results will continue to hold when consumers preferences are dened over both
the levels of public goods provided and their own contributions.
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each consumer i solves the problem:
max
(x;%)2RL+RK+
Ui(x; g i + %)
such that p  x+ q  %  p  ei +
PK
k=1 
k
ik;
where g i =
P
j 6=i gj:
Denition: A private provision equilibrium for the economy E is a price system
(p; q); a vector of inputs yk 2 RL+ for every rm k; a private consumption allo-
cation (xi; i = 1; : : : ; N) and an allocation of public goods
PN
i=1 gi = (g
k; k =
1; : : : K) such that,
(i) (xi; gi) solves the problem of consumer i for every i 2 N :
(ii) yk maximizes rm kprot, for every k:
(iii)
PN
i=1 xi +
PK
k=1 yk 
PN
i=1 ei:
(iv) gk  Fk(yk) for every public good k:
4 Large economies and public goods
Roughly, given a nite economy, we formulate a continuum representation of the
economy in which the actions of each consumer and each rm are negligible from
the viewpoint of other agents but with the property that private goods provision
equilibria for the continuum economy generate a private goods equilibrium for
the nite economy. In our continuum representation, each consumers utility
function depends on her own consumption of private goods, her own provision
of public goods and the average contribution of consumers of each of the other
types.
Continuum economies with only private goods are well studied. The utility
function of a consumer in the continuum depends only on her own consumption
and the consumption bundle of a consumer depends only on her own purchases.
In the presence of (pure) public goods, di¢ culties arise. The contribution of
a consumer towards public good provision has a non-negligible e¤ect on the
consumer, in that it costs him private resources, but only a negligible e¤ect
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on the total amounts produced of public goods. Thus, the consumer optimizes
by contributing zero to public good provision and, in an equilibrium, no public
goods are produced.12 Yet there are theoretical examples one follows where,
as a sequence of economies becomes large, the amount of public good provided
does not converge to zero but instead to some positive, nite amount.13
Example. Let us consider an economy with two agents (1 and 2) that consume
one private good and one public good. Both consumers has the same utility
function U(x;G) = xG; where x denotes the private commodity and G is the
amount of public good. Each consumer owns initially one unit of the private
good. The public good is produced via the production function F (x) = x:
The equilibrium prices are given by p = q = 1; where p is the price for the
private commodity and q is the price for the public good. The private provision
equilibrium allocation for this economy is x1 = x2 =
2
3
; g1 = g2 =
1
3
and
G = g1 + g2 =
2
3
: Now if we consider the r-replica economy, with r agents of
type 1 and r consumers of type 2; then the private provision equilibrium is the
following, p = q = 1 and x1j = x2j =
2r
2r + 1
; and g1j = g2j =
1
2r + 1
for every
j = 1; : : : ; r; which leads to G =
2r
2r + 1
: Observe that the private provision of
the public good provided by each consumer converges to zero when the number
consumers, 2r; converges to innite. In spite of this, every consumer is better o¤
when the economy is enlarged.
It is easy to show that if the utility function for each agent ij in the r-
replica economy is U rij(x; gij; g i) = x(gij + g i); where rg 1 =
Pr
j=1 g2j and
rg 2 =
Pr
j=1 g1j; then the private provision equilibrium is given by, p = q = 1;
x1j = x2j =
2
3
; g1j = g2j =
1
3
and then, g1j + g 1 = g2j + g 2 =
2
3
for every j:
Given the nite economy E ; let us consider an associated economy EC with
a continuum of consumers represented by the real interval C = [0; N ] and a
continuum of rms represented by the real interval I = [0; K]; both endowed
with the Lebesgue measure : Each consumer i in the economy E is represented
in Ec by the real interval Ci = [i  1; i) if i 6= N and consumer N is represented
by CN = [N   1; N ]: Each rm k in E is represented in Ec by Ik = [k   1; k) if
k 6= K and rm K is represented IK = [K   1; K]: Every rm h 2 Ik; has the
same production function Fk : RL+ ! R+:
12Since Muench (1972), various approaches have been proposed to treat this problem.
Muench introduces a distinction between macroquantities and microquantities.
13Similar examples appear elsewhere; see, for example, Andreoni (1988).
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Each consumer t 2 Ci has endowment et = ei and preference relation on the
consumption of private commodities and public goods represented by the utility
function Vt dened below:
In order to dene utility functions Vt we require some notation. Let g :
[0; N ] ! RK+ be a function which species a private provision of public goods
g(t) for every consumer t: We write
gi =
Z
Ci
g(t)d(t)
and
g i =
Z
CnCi
g(t)d(t) =
X
j 6=i
gj:
Having done this, the utility function of an agent t 2 Ii is given by
Vt(x; g i; g(t)) = Ui(x; g i + g(t)):
Each consumer t 2 Ci owns the share kt = ki of the prots of the rms of type
k. We will refer to individuals in Ci as consumers of type i:
At this point, the denition of a private provision equilibrium for the con-
tinuum economy is clear agents maximize given prices and feasibility must be
satised so we do not provide a formal statement. Since the utility functions
are concave it is easy to show that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4.1 A private provision equilibrium for the nite economy induces
an equilibrium for the continuum economy and the converse.
(i) If prices (p; q); input bundles (yk; k = 1; : : : ; K), and allocations (xi; gi; i =
1; : : : ; N) constitute a private provision equilibrium for the economy E then
(p; q; y; x; g) is a private provision equilibrium for the economy EC ; where
x(t) = xi and g(t) = gi for every t 2 Ci and y(h) = yk for every h 2 Ik:
(ii) Reciprocally, if (p; q); the -integrable function of inputs y and the al-
locations (x(t); g(t); t 2 C) constitute a private provision equilibrium for
the economy EC ; with g(t) = gi for every t 2 Ci; then (p; q; yk; xi; gi; i =
1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ; K) is a private provision equilibrium for the economy
E ; where xi =
R
Ci
x(t)d(t) for every i = 1; : : : ; N and yk =
R
Ik
y(h)d(h)
for every k = 1; : : : ; K:
13
The relationships in Proposition 4.1 enable us to relate private provision equi-
librium to the Nash equilibrium for the strategic market game dened in the next
section.
5 A game for the private provision of public
goods
In this section, given an economy E we provide a strategic-form game where the
players are the continuum of rms that produce the public goods and the contin-
uum of consumers in the associated economy EC : The game models a situation
where consumers take all their endowment of private goods to trading posts and
borrow some amount of money, uniformly bounded by a constant M > 0; to
spend on private goods and contribute to public good provision. If a consumer
spends more than the value of her endowment, determined endogenously, she
pays a penalty. The value of her endowment is determined by endogenously
generated prices.
We now dene the strategy choices available to the players and specify a price
formation mechanism which denes a trading outcome. Note that, in contrast
to the private provision equilibrium, a feasible outcome is determined for each
strategy prole.
Following Shapley-Shubik (1977), each private commodity is traded at a trad-
ing post and, as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), each player t surrenders her
entire endowment of good ` to the `th post. Therefore the `th post receives the
total endowment, in the continuum economy, of the `th good;
e` =
Z
C
e`td(t) (=
NX
i=1
e`i):
Our strategic model also has a provision postfor each of the K public goods.
Consumers strategically choose amounts of at money to deliver to each post.
The money delivered to each trading post ` is for purchase of private commodities
and the amount delivered to the kth provision posts is for provision of kth public
good. As in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), in order to trigger (or, in other
words, to start) the market we assume that an external agent places 1 unit of
at money in each of these L+K posts.
A strategy for a consumer t 2 C is given by a vector t 2 RL+ that species an
14
amount of at money that she delivers to each trading post and a vector t 2 RK+
that species the amount she delivers to each provision post. Given the bound
M on total expenditure of a consumer, the strategy set for a consumer is given
by
AM = fs = (; ) 2 RL+  RK+ : such that
LX
`=1
` +
KX
k=1
k Mg:
A strategy for a rm h 2 I is given by a vector  specifying the amount of
at money that the rm delivers to each one of the L trading posts to purchase
private inputs in order produce the public commodities. Thus, the strategy set
for a rm is
BM = f 2 RL+ : 0 < " 
LX
`=1
` MN + 1g:14
A strategy prole is a triple (; ; ) = ((t; t)t2C ; (h)h2I) belonging to ACM
BIM and satisfying the property that the functions (; ) : C ! RL+K+ and  :
I ! RL+ are -integrable.15
Given a strategy prole,  = ((t; t)t2C ;  = (h)h2I) ; prices for each private
commodity ` 2 f1; : : : ; Lg arise in each of the corresponding post according to
the next rule:
p`() =
#` + '` + 1
e`
> 0;
where #` =
R
C
`td(t) and '
` =
R
I
`hd(h):
Let p() := (p`(); ` = 1; : : : ; L) 2 RL+: Given strategy prole , let xt(),
dened by
x`t() =
`t
p`()
; t 2 C;
denote the commodity bundle assigned to the consumer t 2 C and let yh(),
dened by
y`h() =
`h
p`()
; h 2 I; ` = 1; : : : ; L,
14To obtain the private provision of public goods equilibrium as a limit of Nash equilibria,
we will consider a sequence of games with M going to innity and " going to zero.
15We remark that we are going to deal only with symmetric strategy proles, which allows
us to avoid some measure-theoretic technicalities.
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denote the bundle of inputs assigned to the rm h 2 Ik to produce the public
good k.
Firm h 2 Ik uses the bundle of inputs yh() to produce a level of public good
k given by Gh() = Fk(yh()): In order to dene the price formation rule for the
public goods, we need to avoid dividing by zero. Thus, given " > 0 and a price
system p  0 for the private commodities, let us dene the minimum e¢ cient
production level for rms that produces the public good k as follows: mk"(p) > 0
is the maximum level of production of public good k that can be obtained with
the vector of inputs given by 
`
p`
such that
PL
`=1 
` = ": That is, mk"(p) = Fk(by)
where by` = b`
p`
and b solves the following problem:
max

Fk

`
p`
; ` = 1; : : : ; L

such that
LX
`=1
` = ":
In this way, the price for each public good k is dened as
qk() =
8>>>><>>>>:
k + 1
Gk()
if Gk()  mk"(p())
k + 1
mk"(p())
otherwise,
where Gk() =
Z
Ik
Gh()d(h) and k =
Z
C
kt d(t):
Note that the price formation mechanism for public goods is well-dened and,
for any " > 0, gives incentives to rms to produce positive amounts of public
goods, as we will show:
To complete the description of the game it remains to state the payo¤ func-
tions for each player. Let h denote the payo¤ function for a rm h 2 I and
let t denote the payo¤ function for a consumer t 2 C: Given a strategy prole
 = (; ; ), dene
h() = q
k()Fk(yh()) 
PL
`=1p
`()y`h(); for each h 2 Ik.
In dening the payo¤ function t for each consumer t 2 C; we assume that
at money has no utility. Given a strategy prole  = (; ; ); the amount of
public good k nanced by player t is gkt () =
kt
qk()
: Since a consumer t receives
money from the sale of her endowment and her shares of the prots of rms, her
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net decit is given by,
dt() = dt(; ; ) =
LX
`=1
`t +
KX
k=1
kt  
LX
`=1
p`()e`t  
KX
k=1
ktk();
where k() =
R
Ik
h()d(h): We now dene, for any strategy prole ; and
every t 2 Ci;
t() = Ui(xt(); g i() + gt())  dt+();
where dt+() = maxf0; dt()g and g i() =
R
CnCigt()d(t):
Note that the use of the maximum to dene the payo¤ functions for consumers
means that, in spite of the fact that consumers do not ascribe utility to at money,
they are penalized in the case of default, that is, if the consumer spends more
than the value of her endowment.
Let us denote the game by G(";M). Given a strategy prole  = ((t)t2C ; (h)h2I) 2
ACM BIM ; we denote by  n 0h the strategy prole which coincides with  except
for the rm h and where strategy 0h replaces h. Denote by  n 0t the prole
which coincides with  except for consumer t and where strategy 0t replaces t:
A Nash equilibrium for the game G(";M) is a strategy prole  such that
t()  t( n 0t) for every 0t 2 AM and almost all players t 2 [0; N ] and
h()  h( n 0h) for every 0h 2 BM and for almost all rm h 2 [0; K]:
6 A Nash equilibrium existence result
In this Section, we present an existence result for Nash equilibrium where every
player of the same type selects the same strategy, that is, we show that the set
of symmetric Nash equilibria for the game G(";M) is non-empty.
We say that a strategy prole (; ; ) is symmetric if (; ) is constant in
every Ci and  is constant in every Ik, that is, (t; t) = (i; i); for every t 2 Ci
and h = k for every h 2 Ik: In other words, in any symmetric strategy prole,
rms with the same technology select the same strategy and consumers of the
same type select the same strategy. Thus, any symmetric strategy prole belongs
to ANM  BKM :
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Theorem 6.1 For every 0 < " < M the set of symmetric Nash equilibria for
the game G(";M) is non-empty.
Lemma 6.1 Let  = (; ; ) 2 ANM  BKM be a symmetric Nash equilibrium for
the game G(";M): Then () = 0 and Gk() > 0 for every public good k:
Remark. The positivity of production levels of each public good is a result of
our price formation rule for public goods, which is dened using the minimum
e¢ cient production level. This is crucial for our incorporation of production
into the strategic market game approach.16
7 The main result
Let us consider a sequence of positive real numbers "M which converges to zero
when M goes to innity. In this section, we show that a private provision equi-
librium for the economy E can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of prices
and allocations resulting from the sequence of symmetric Nash equilibria of the
games G("M ;M) when M goes to innity. For it, given a vector a 2 RL+; let
kak PL`=1 a`:
Theorem 7.1 For each natural number M; let M = (M;t; M;t; M;h; t 2 C; h 2
I) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game G("M ;M):
Let (pM ; qM ; xM ; gM ; yM) be the corresponding sequence of prices and alloca-
tions dened by this sequence of Nash equilibria.
Then, there exists a subsequence of

(pM ;qM )
kpM ;qMk ; xM ; gM ; yM

that converges to a
price system (p; q) and an allocation (x; g; y) such that (p; q; x; g; y) is a private
provision equilibrium for the economy E : Neutrality
Let us consider the economy E described in Section 2. We do not require
constant returns to scale, however.
A redistribution of endowments is any allocation e^ such that
PN
i=1 ei =PN
i=1 e^i: Let E(e^) denote the economy which coincides with E except for the
endowment is given by e^, a redistribution of e:
16We thank Ali Khan and Rabah Amir for discussions pointing to the importance of this
feature of our model.
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Lemma 7.1 Let (p; q; x; g) be prices and allocations such that p  xi + q  gi =
p  ei for every consumer i: Consider a redistribution e^ of endowments such that
p  xi  p  e^i; for every i: Then, there exists an allocation of public goods g^ such
that q  g^i = p  (e^i   xi) for every consumer i and
PN
i=1 gi =
PN
i=1 g^i:
Note that the redistribution in the above Theorem allows each consumer to
a¤ord the equilibrium bundle of private goods she is assigned in the initial allo-
cation. This is important to the Lemma and to the following result.
Theorem 7.2 (Neutrality). Let (p; q; xi ; g

i ; i = 1 : : : ; N) be a private pro-
vision equilibrium for the economy E : Let e^ be a redistribution of endowments
among contributing consumers for every public good, such that pxi  pe^i; for
every consumer i: Then, there exists an allocation of public goods g^i; i = 1 : : : ; n;
such that (p; q; xi ; g^i; i = 1 : : : ; N); is a private provision equilibrium for the
economy E(e^) and PNi=1 g^i =PNi=1 gi :
Consider the initial equilibrium (p; q; xi ; g

i ; i = 1 : : : ; N). One candidate for
an equilibrium after a redistribution satisfying the conditions of the Lemma is
given by (p; q; xi ; g^i; i = 1 : : : ; N), where
PN
i=1 g^i =
PN
i=1 g

i . Note that in the
proposed equilibrium, each consumer must still be maximizing. He can a¤ord
his original allocation of private goods and the total amount of public goods is
the same. Also, the same equilibrium prices can hold in both the rst and the
second equilibrium In the one-private-good case, this is essentially the same as
the BBV neutrality result. BBV, however, consider redistributions of income
among contributing consumers such that no consumer loses more income than his
original contribution,while we consider redistributions with the property that
no consumer looses more income (determined by the original equilibrium prices)
than that required to buy his initial equilibrium bundle. In the one-private-goods
case, the these two sorts of redistributions are ip-sides of the same assumption.
In the multiple-private-goods case it is more subtle.
Our restriction on redistributions is crucial. In Villanaci and Zenginobuz
(2007), with many private goods and a strictly decreasing returns to scale pro-
duction technology for the public good, relative price e¤ects of redistribution
have consequences. VZ (2007) shows that under exactly the same kind of re-
distribution as in BBV neutrality (of all equilibria) will not follow if one allows
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for relative price e¤ects.17 They show that there exists redistributions of endow-
ments that satisfy BBVs requirements and at the same time decrease the overall
public good level (or increase it if that is what is wanted). Change in the relative
price is the key in obtaining their non-neutrality result. In contrast, our result
shows that there exists an equilibrium that satises neutrality; we do not claim
that all equilibria after redistribution satisfy neutrality; for such a claim to hold,
at least some additional conditions would be required.
Our strategic market game results show not only that there are equilibria
that satisfy neutrality but also that these equilibria can be approximated by the
equilibria of strategic games with many players.
8 Conclusions
In summary, as the discussion and citations in Dubey and Geanakoplos makes
clear, providing strategic foundations for the Walrasian equilibrium has been an
important item on the research agenda of economics. Using the market-game
approach, the current paper demonstrates that analogous foundations hold for
the private provision equilibrium of Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005) and the
results of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) are approximated by strategic
equilibrium of a fully general model of strategic equilibrium.
17See also Villanaci and Zenginobuz (2012).
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Appendix: Proofs.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let Fh be a correspondence which associates to each
symmetric strategy prole in ANM BKM the best reply of the rm h 2 I: That is,
given the strategy prole  = (; ; ) 2 ANM  BKM
Fh() = arg max
h2BM
h( n h)
Note that, by symmetry, Fh is the same for every rm h 2 Ik so, for simplicity,
we denote Fh by Fk: By denition, p() = p( n h) which allows us to obtain
that yh( n h) is linear in h: Moreover, since Fk is concave for each k and
q() = q( n h) we can conclude that h is concave in the rm hs strategy:
From the price formation rule, for each commodity ` it holds that p`()  1=e`
and p is continuous in : Moreover, the Maximum Theorem ensures that for
every k the function mk" is continuous in prices p, which implies that q is also
continuous in : Thus, the payo¤ function h is continuous in the strategy prole
 and BM is a non-empty convex and compact set. Consequently, Fk takes non-
empty and convex values and the Maximum Theorem allows us to conclude that
the correspondence Fk from ANM BKM to BM is upper semi-continuous for every
k = 1; : : : ; K:
Let Ct be a correspondence which associates to each symmetric strategy pro-
le the best reply of the player t 2 C: That is, given the strategy prole
 = (; ; ) 2 ANM  BKM
Ct() = argmax
t2AM
t( n t)
Note that, by symmetry, Ct is the same for every consumer t 2 Ci and we
denote Ct by Ci: By denition, p() = p( n t) which implies that xt( n (t; t))
is linear in t and does not depend on t: Moreover, since q() = q( n t); we
have that, for every k; gkt ( n (t; t)) is linear in kt and does not depend on
t (which follows from our assumption of a continuum of players). Since Ui is
both concave and monotonic and dt( n t) is linear in t; we have that the payo¤
function t is concave in the strategy selected by player t: Furthermore, AM is a
non-empty, convex and compact set and, since the prices p and q are continuous
in  and Ui is a continuous function, we can deduce that the payo¤ function
t is continuous in : This implies that Ci takes non-empty convex values and
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the maximum theorem allows us to conclude that the correspondence Ci; from
ANM  BKM to AM , is upper semi-continuous for every i = 1; : : : ; N:
Finally, let us consider the correspondence   = (C1; : : : ; CN ;F1; : : : ;FK): By
Kakutanis theorem   has a xed point, which actually is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Since h = k for every h 2 Ik; we have that h() =
k() for every rm h 2 Ik: Let us suppose that k() < 0 (respectively k() >
0) for some k: This implies that
PL
`=1 
`
k > 1 > " (respectively
PL
`=1 
`
k <PN
i=1 
k
i + 1  MN + 1). Then we can take  < 1 (respectively  > 1) so that
k 2 BM and k( n k) > k() which is a contradiction with the fact that
 is a Nash equilibrium.
To nish the proof, let us show that Fk(yk())  mk"(p()) for every k: To
obtain a contradiction, assume that Fk(yk()) < mk"(p()) for some k: Then,
k() =
k + 1
mk"(p())
Fk(yk())  
LX
`=1
` < k + 1  
LX
`=1
`: Consider a strategy
bk such that mk"(p()) = Fk yk( n bk) : We have that k( n bk) = k +
1  
LX
`=1
b`k = k + 1   " > k(): Therefore, if the symmetric strategy prole
 = (; ; ) 2 ANM BKM is a Nash equilibrium then Gk()  mk"(p()); for every
k:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Since M = ((M;t; M;t; t 2 C); M;h; h 2 I) is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game G("M ;M); we have M;t = M;i for
every t 2 Ci and every type i of consumers and M;h = M;k for every h 2 Ik:
This equilibrium denes the prices pM = (p`M ; ` = 1; : : : ; L) and qM = (q
k
M ; k =
1; : : : ; K) which leads to the allocation xM = (xM;i; i = 1; : : : ; N); contributions
to public goods gM = (gM;i; i = 1; : : : ; N); inputs yM;k used in the production of
the public good k and net decits (dM;i; i = 1; : : : ; N):
The denition of the game ensures that
Z
C
xM;td(t) +
Z
I
yM;hd(h) =
NX
i=1
xM;i +
KX
k=1
yM;k  e =
NX
i=1
ei =
Z
C
etd(t):
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Thus, the consumption bundles allocated to consumers xM and the sequence of
inputs yM are bounded. Moreover, since
PN
i=1 g
k
M;i  Fk(yM;k)  Fk(e); we have
that each sequence gkM;i is also bounded.
Note that if a player t 2 Ci selects the strategy  = 0 and  = 0; then she
has payo¤Ui(0; g i(M))  U(0; 0); with g i(M) =
P
j 6=i gM;j: This implies that
Ui(e; F (e))   dM;i+  Ui(xM;i;
PN
i=1 gM;i)   dM;i+  Ui(0; 0) and, consequently,
dM;i+ is bounded from above by Ui(e; F (e))  Ui(0; 0):
For each M let us consider the sets of types of consumers dened as follows:
DM = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Ng such that dM;i > 0g and
SM = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Ng such that dM;i < 0g:
That is, DM is the subset of types agents who are in decit and SM is the set of
agents who are in surplus. It trivially holds the next equality
NX
i=1
dM;i =
X
i2DM
dM;i +
X
i2SM
dM;i:
By Lemma 5.1 equilibrium prots are null, that is, M;k = k(M) = 0 for every
k and every M: Simple calculations then show that
0 = L+K +
NX
i=1
dM;i = L+K  
X
i2SM
 dM;i +
X
i2DM
dM;i;
which implies that
X
i2SM
 dM;i = L+K +
X
i2DM
dM;i is also bounded from above.
Since dM;i+ is bounded it follows that  dM;i is also bounded. Finally, we can
conclude that dM;i is bounded.
Thus if we consider a sequence (yM ; xM;i; gM;i; dM;i; i = 1; : : : ; N)M with M
going to innity, there exists a converging subsequence with limit (y; xi; di; i =
1; : : : ; N): Moreover, the sequence
(pM ; qM)
kpM ; qMk has also a convergent subsequence
with limit (p; q): We write yM ! y; xM;i ! xi; dM;i ! di; for each type i and
(pM ; qM)
kpM ; qMk ! (p; q):
For each M we have M;k = qkMFk(yM;k)   pMyM;k: As we have already re-
marked, by Lemma 5.1, M;k = 0: Then, dM;i =
PL
`=1 
`
M;i +
PK
k=1 
k
M;i   pMei:
Moreover, since L +K > 0 the set SM is nonempty. Moreover, every consumer
of type i in SM must bid all the money that she can borrow. Otherwise, such a
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consumer could increase the bidding in every private commodity, which entails
a strict increase in the private consumption quantities of her bundle without
incurring any penalty; in consequence her payo¤ will increase, which contradicts
the the supposition of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, since any agent of
type i 2 SM has surplus we have that pMei > M , which implies that kpMk ! 1
when M !1 and, in consequence, that kpM ; qMk ! 1 when M !1
Now, we can write
dM;i
kpM ; qMk =
LX
`=1
`M;i +
KX
k=1
kM;i  
LX
`=1
p`Me
`
i
kpM ; qMk
=
LX
`=1
p`Mx
`
M;i + qMgM;i  
LX
`=1
p`Me
`
i
kpM ; qMk
=
pM
kpM ; qMk(xM;i   ei) +
qM
kpM ; qMkgM;i
Since kpMk ! 1 and dM;i is bounded for every type i; it follows that
pM
kpM ; qMk(xM;i   ei) +
qM
kpM ; qMkgM;i ! 0; that is, p(xi   ei) + qgi = 0 for all
i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng:
Let us show that p is non-zero. To obtain a contradiction, assume that p = 0;
that is, p
`
M
kpM ;qMk converges to zero for every `: This implies that there exists a
public good k such that q
k
M
kpMk goes to 1 when M increases. Consider a real
number  > 0 and let  = (; : : : ; ) 2 RL++: For each M let b`M = p`MkpMk : Note
that b`M 2 BM for all M large enough. If any rm h 2 Ik deviates from M and
chooses bM = (b`M ; ` = 1; : : : ; L) the prices remain the same and the payo¤ that
this rm gets is
h(M nbM) = qkMFk y(M n bM) pM y(M nbM) = qkMkpMkFk() 
LX
`=1
p`M
kpMk:
We remark that Fk() > 0;
LX
`=1
p`M
kpMk =  and
qkM
kpMk is an unbounded sequence.
Then h(M n bM) is strictly positive for all M large enough, in contradiction
with the fact that M is Nash equilibrium for G("M ;M) for every M: Therefore,
since ei  0; we have pxi + qgi = pei > 0:
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Let us show that for every i we have Ui(z; g i + g)  Ui(xi; g i + gi) for any
(z; g) in the budget set Bi(p; q); where
Bi(p; q) = f(; ) 2 RL+1+ such that p + q  peig:
To this end, let us take any real number  2 (0; 1) and a bundle (z; g) 2 Bi(p; q):
Then, pz + qg  pei = (pxi + qgi) < pxi + qgi: This implies that, for all
M su¢ ciently large,
pM
kpM ; qMkz+
qM
kpM ; qMkg <
pM
kpM ; qMkxM;i +
qM
kpM ; qMkgM;i
and thus pMz + qMg < pMxM;i + qMgM;i  M: Let us consider the strategy
^M = (^M ; ^M) given by ^
`
M = p
`
Mz
` and ^kM = q
k
Mg
k:
Note that
LX
`=1
^
`
M +
KX
k=1
^kM = pMz + qMg and (^M ; ^M) 2 AM : Note also
that the net decit that any consumer t 2 Ci obtains by deviating and selecting
^t = ^M is
dt(Mn^t) =
"
LX
`=1
^
`
M +
LX
`=1
^kM   pMei
#
+

"
pMxM;i +
KX
k=1
kM;i   pMei
#
+
= dM;i = dt(M):
Therefore, since M is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that
Ui(xM;i; g i(M) + gM;i)  Ui(z; g i(M) + g):
Finally, passing to the limit and observing that the choice of  < 1 was arbitrary,
we conclude that Ui(xi; g i + gi)  Ui(z; g i + g):
Recall that h(M) = q
k
MFk(yM;k)   pMyM;k = 0 for every h 2 Ik and then
qkFk(yk)  pyk = 0 for every h 2 Ik: To nish the proof, it remains to show that
the input vector yk maximizes prots for every rm h 2 Ik at prices (p; q): Assume
that there exists z 2 RL+ such that qkFk(z)  pz > 0 for some k: Note that, since
Fk is continuous and p 6= 0; without loss of generality we can consider z  0:
This implies that q
k
M
kpM ;qMkFk(z)  
pM
kpM ;qMkz > 0; for all M large enough. On the
other hand, since p 6= 0 and z 2 R++ there exists real numbers a and a such that
0 < a <
PL
`=1 p
`z` < a and then the strategy ^h; given by ^
`
h =
p`Mz
`
kpM ;qMk ; belongs
to BM for all M large enough. Note that yh( n ^h) = zkpM ;qMk : Moreover, there
exists M^ such that h(M n ^h) = qkMFk

z
kpM ;qMk

  pM zkpM ;qMk > h(M) = 0;
for all M  M^; for all h 2 Ik: This is in contradiction with the fact that M is a
Nash equilibrium of the game G("M ;M) for every M:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8.1. Let ei = e^i   ei:
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We will dene three di¤erent sets of consumers. To which set a consumer i
belongs depends on whether pei is less than, greater than, or equal to zero.
For each set, we develop an algorithm to assign new levels of public good con-
tributions to each agent in the set. These assignments are made in such a way
as to ensure that the total of assignments
PN
i=1 g^i equals the total amounts of
public goods given by the initial allocation,
PN
i=1 gi:
Set A: Let A denote the set of consumers i for whom pei < 0: Thus, A
consists of those consumers for whom the values of endowments have decreased.
Given i 2 A, denote by k(i) the lowest index number on public goods for
which the change in the absolute value of endowment jpeij is less than the
total value of her contributions summed over all the public goods with lower
index numbers; that is, k(i) = minfk : jpeij  ki :=
Pk
h=1 q
hghi g:
For every agent i 2 A let us dene gi as follows:
gki =
8>>><>>>:
 gki if k < k(i)
pei+k 1i
qk
if k = k(i)
0 otherwise.
That is, for the kth public good, k < k(i), the ith consumers new assignment
of public good contribution is equal to zero. For k = k(i) the ith consumers
contribution is equal, in value, to the di¤erence between the change in the value
of her endowment and the amount that she initially spent on the public goods
indexed 1; :::; k(i), and, for k > k(i) the ith consumers new assignment of public
good contribution is equal to her initial assignment .
For each i 2 A, dene g^i = gi +gi:
Set B. Now let B denote the set of consumers i for whom p  ei > 0; that
is, B is the set of consumers for whom the value of endowment increases under
the redistribution. To construct variations of the public goods contributions for
consumers in B by induction let us write B = fb1; : : : ; bng:
For each public good k; let k(b1) =
P
i2A q
kgki (the sum, over the members
of A, of the values of the changes in public good k dened above) and let k1 =Pkh=1 h(b1) denote the absolute value of the sum of these changes.
Now, for the rst consumer in the set B, b1, let k(b1) = minfk : p eb1  k1g,
the lowest index number on public goods for which the change in the value of
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endowment (peb1) is (weakly) less than the amounts by which the values of the
public goods contributions of consumers in A of good k have decreased:18 For
k(b1) = 1, dene
gkb1 =
8<:
peb1
q1
if k = 1
0 otherwise
For k(b1) > 1, gkb1 is dened as follows
gkb1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
jk(b1)j
qk
if k < k(b1)
peb1 k 11
qk
if k = k(b1)
0 otherwise.
Suppose that jBj > 1.
Dene k(bi) = k(bi 1) + qkgkbi 1 : Let 
k
i =
Pkh=1 h(bi) For every i 2 B
let k(bi) = minfk : p ebi  ki g: The modication gkbi is dened as follows. If
k(bi) = 1, dene
gkbi =
8<:
pebi
q1
if k = 1
0 otherwise
Otherwise, dene
gkbi =
8>>>><>>>>:
jk(bi)j
qk
if k < k(bi)
pebi k 1i
qk
if k = k(bi)
0 otherwise:
Finally, gi = 0 if p  ei = p  e^i:
By construction q gi = p ei and
PN
i=1 gi =
PN
i=1 g^i:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Since the production functions for public goods exhibit
constant returns to scale, we have zero prots at equilibrium. Moreover, for
every consumer i the bundle (x1; G
); where G =
PN
i=1 g

i ; solves the following
individual problem:
max(x;G)2IRL+K+ Ui(x;G)
such that p  x+ q G  p  ei + q  g i
G  g i
18There is such a k(1) since q  gi = p  ei for all i 2 A and then, for all bi 2 B,P
i2A q gi
  p ebi because Pi2A p ei =Pbi2B p ebi :
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where g i =
P
j 6=i g

j :
By the previous Lemma we can take g^ such that q  g^i = p  e^i   p  x for
every i and
PN
i=1 g^i = G
:
It remains to show that, for every i, the bundle (xi ; G
) is a solution for the
following problem:
max(x;G)2IRL+K+ Ui(x;G)
such that p  x+ q G  p  e^i + q  g^ i
G  g^ i
where g^ i =
P
j 6=i g^j:
Note that p  e^i + q  g^ i = p  ei + q  g i:
Let us write e^i = ei +ei:
If p  ei < 0 the budget set for consumer i becomes smaller and (x; G)
belongs to it.
Consider the case p ei > 0 and assume that there is a bundle (x;G) which
is possible for agent i after redistribution of endowments and is preferred to
(xi ; G
): Then, for every  su¢ ciently close to 1, (xi ; G
) + (1   )(x;G) is
a¤ordable for agent i before the redistribution of endowments and by convexity
of preferences this bundle is also preferred to (xi ; G
); which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
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